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FEDERAL PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTION
IS CHARACTERIZED AS PENAL UNDER STATE LAW
Plaintiffs brought a treble damage action under section 4 of the
Clayton Act1 alleging violations by defendant oil companies of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' These violations purportedly occurred
some two years prior to the filing of plaintiffs' action. The district court
for the southern district of California dismissed the action on the
ground that it was barred by the one year California statute of limita-
tions relating to statutory forfeitures or penalties.' On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Held: A private anti-
trust action under the Clayton Act is an action to recover a penalty
within the meaning of the California statute of limitations. Lek v.
General Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. granted,
85 Sup. Ct. 148 (1964).'
As early as the fifteenth century, various English statutes, particu-
larly those regulating trade, provided that any member of the public
could bring an action to recover at least part of the heavy penalty im-
posed for a violation.5 The Tudors encouraged enforcement of these
statutes by granting certain persons patents to sue. This practice led to
so much blackmail and other abuse that severe restrictions were placed
upon these "penal" actions.' However, actions to recover damages
greater than the injury suffered have not always been subject to such
restrictions. Many actions to recover multiple damages or fixed mini-
mum damages have long been held to be unrestricted remedial actions
both in England and in the United States.'
115 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).3 Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 208 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the state
statute of limitations was tolled, under section 5 of the Clayton Act, by a similar action
instituted by the United States. This issue is one of independent significance. See
Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical Manufacturers: The Statute
of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. R-v. 29, 42-48 (1962). The issue was
not, however, of major concern to either the district or circuit court in this case and is
not discussed in this casenote.
54 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 356 (3d ed. 1923).
6 "The informer was not allowed to sue by attorney, no compounding of the action
was to be allowed without leave of the court, a year was fixed as the limitation for an
informer's action unless the statute fixed a shorter period. Still further regulations
were made by a statute of 1624... ." Id. at 356-357.
7 E.g., copyright infringement (minimum damages) ; ouster of tenant without notice
(double damages); traveler injured through defect in highway (double damages).
Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 153, 155-56 (1899).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Although association of modem antitrust suits with traditional penal
actions seems historically anomalous, the penal-remedial dichotomy has
caused much difficulty for federal courts in antitrust litigation. Once
the penal-remedial issue is raised, two basic questions are presented.
The first is whether state or federal law should govern the characteriza-
tion of a private antitrust action. The second is whether such an action
should be characterized as penal or remedial.
Some lower federal courts, influenced by federal origination and
dominance of antitrust legislation, have adopted federal characteri-
zation of private antitrust actions.' These courts, guided by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta,9 have concluded that such an action is remedial in
character."0 Other federal courts have not specifically discussed
whether state or federal law should control characterization of the
action. These courts have simply observed that the federal antitrust
statutes included no limitation for private actions and have gone on to
interpret the statutes of limitation of the forum states." As a result of
varying state statutes and interpretations, the circuit courts of appeals
are sharply divided on the question whether a treble damage action
under the Clayton Act is penal or remedial. 2
The district court in the principal case determined, and the plaintiffs
8 See, e.g., Fulton v. Loew's Inc., 114 F. Supp. 676 (D. Kan. 1953) ; Momand v.
Universal Film Exch., 43 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1942).
9203 U.S. 390 (1906). In this case the Court held that a private antitrust action is
not an action to recover a penalty within the meaning of a general federal statute of
limitations requiring actions for penalties to be brought within five years. REv. STAT.
§ 1047 (1875), 28 U.S.C. 2462 (1948). The decision has not been controlling because
it has been limited to the particular statute there involved. E.g., Bertha Bldg. Corp. v.
National Theatres Corp, 269 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960);
Sun Theatres Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954).
10 See, e.g., Fulton v. Loew's Inc., 114 F. Supp. 676 (D. Kan. 1953) ; Momand v.
Universal Film Exch., 43 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1942). In Hicks v. Bekins Moving
& Storage Co., 87 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1937), a decision overruled by implication in the
principal case, the Ninth Circuit stated that a private antitrust action "is not an action
to recover a penalty." 87 F2d at 585. Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly
adopt federal characterization in Hicks, the doctrine was strongly implied.
"1 See, e.g., Gordon v. Loew's Inc., 247 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Momand v. Uni-
versal Film Exch., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949).
22 In the following cases the treble damage action has been characterized as rem-
edial: Momand v. Universal Film Exch, 172 F2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 967 (1949) ; Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co, 293 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1961). In the following cases the treble damage
action has been characterized as penal: Gordon v. Loew's Inc., 247 F.2d 451 (3d Cir.
1957) ; North Carolina Theatres, Inc. v. Thompson, 277 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1960);
Grengs v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); Powell v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 276 F.2d 464 (8th Cir.
1960).
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conceded on appeal, that state law controlled characterization of the
action.'" The court of appeals relied upon Bertha Bldg. Corp. v.
National Theatres Corp." as supporting state characterization. Bertha
Bldg., however, contains statements which would appear to support
either state or federal characterization, and seems to leave the matter
unresolved. 5 Concluding that California law was to be controlling, the
court determined that the action was penal in character 6 and Califor-
nia's one year statute applied to bar the suit.
Congress has enacted a four year statute of limitations for private
actions arising under the federal antitrust statutes which were not
barred under existing law on January 7, 1956.11 Because the cause of
action in the principal case accrued in 1954, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the action was barred under existing law, and the new
statute of limitations did not apply.
Treble damage actions in which the alleged cause of action accrued
prior to 1956 will soon cease to appear. If only the statute of limitations
aspect of penal characterization were involved, the importance of the
principal case might be minimal. Penal characterization, however,
creates at least two other significant obstacles to the bringing of a pri-
vate antitrust action. First, the treble damage aspect of the action will
13 Brief for Appellants, p. 22. The court stated in a footnote, Leh v. General Petro-
leum Corp., 330 F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1964), that amici curiae argued for federal
characterization. Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962), and Simler v. Con-
nor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963), were relied upon by amici curiae, but the court deemed these
non-antitrust cases irrelevant. Smith v. Cremins, a civil rights case, contains the follow-
statement: "[T]he federal court accepts the state's interpretation of its own statute of
limitations, but determines for itself the nature of the right conferred by the federal
statute." 308 F2d at 189.
'4269 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960). Also cited were
Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), and Costello v. Bank of Am., 246
F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1957). The latter cases support a contention that construction of a
state statute of limitations is a matter of state law. But neither involves an antitrust
action and neither addresses itself specifically to the issue of federal versus state char-
acterization of the cause of action.
15The court quoted the following passage from Bertha Bldg.: "[F]ederal courts
must accept the statutes as construed and interpreted by the... [state] courts. It is for
them to determine what is meant by the word 'penalty' in the... [state] statute." The
two sentences immediately following the quoted passage were left unquoted by the
court: "But the purposes attributable to the federal antitrust laws must be governed
by federal law. Accordingly, to determine whether a suit for treble damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act has the characteristics of actions encompassed by the
three year New York statute federal decisions must be examined." 269 F2d at 788.
16 There are no California cases interpreting the character of the action created by
the Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750, which allows treble damages in
private antitrust actions. In a preponderance of cases, however, California courts con-
clude that actions to recover multiple damages are penal. See, e.g., Grossblatt v.
Wright, 108 Cal. App2d 475, 239 P.2d 19 (1951) ; Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal.2d
818, 142 P.2d 299 (1943).
17 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1955).
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not survive the death of the wrongdoer. 8 Second, the treble damage
action will not be assignable. 9
The purpose of the treble damage action is to encourage suits by
injured parties against violators of the federal antitrust statutes." The
obstacles created by penal characterization are inconsistent with this
policy. The plaintiff in a private antitrust action, unlike the informer
plaintiffs of early English penal actions, deserves and needs what assist-
ance the courts can afford him.2 A party injured by a conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Act, even if he obtains a judgment, frequently
suffers more actual injury than treble damages can repair.2 Often,
as was true of the plaintiffs in the principal case, he will no longer be
in business. In losing part or all of his business, he loses many intan-
gible assets for which no damages are allowed.23 By resorting to
litigation, he faces the almost inevitable danger of future business
harassment.2' Legal damages and actual harm are always distinct con-
cepts; in private antitrust actions the disparity between the two is par-
ticularly pronounced. In light of these factors, remedial characteriza-
tion is an extremely desirable result.2
Federal characterization of the cause of action, influenced as it is by
18 See, e.g., Rogers v. Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Haskell
v. Perkins, 28 F2d 222 (D.N.J. 1928). It might well be that the action itself does not
survive. See Bowles v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 147 F2d 425, 430 (6th Cir. 1945).
10 Penal actions are not assignable. Strickland v. Sellers, 78 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Tex.
1948) ; Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76 (1884). On the other hand, decisions in
which private antitrust actions have been characterized as remedial have permitted
assignability. Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649 (D.
Okla. 1941) ; Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 87 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1937). It
has been held that the question of assignability is one of right, not of procedure, and
that, therefore, FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), governing capacity to sue, does not apply.
Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., supra. But cf., Coast v. Hunt Oil Co.,
96 F. Supp. 53, 55-56 (W.D. La. 1951), aff'd, 195 F2d 870 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied
344 U.S. 836 (1952).
20 See McConnell, The Treble Damage Issue: a Strong Dissent, 50 NW. U.L. Ray.
342,342-43 (1955).
21 In Harman v. Valley Na!l Bank, 5 Tina E REG. REP. 71, 327, at 80, 372 (9th Cir.
1964), the Ninth Circuit stated that federal courts in private antitrust actions "should
not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth
by Congress....
22 Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?,
28 Ky. L.J., 117, 120-21 (1940).
23 Id. at 124, 13940.
24 Id. at 141-42; McConnell, The Treble Damage Issue: a Strong Dissent, 50 Nw.
U.L. Ray. 342, 348 (1955). See United States v. International Workers, 100 F2d 541
(1938).
25 The following commentators indicate agreement: Vold, .supra note 22, at 117-18;
McConnell, supra note 24, at 342-48; Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against
Electrical Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L.
Ray. 29, 32-33 (1962). ProfessorVold is particularly vigorous and persuasive in arguing
against penal characterization.
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Chattanooga,26 leads to remedial characterization. Federal character-
ization has the additional advantage of promoting uniformity in the
application of the federal antitrust laws. Such a result is in keeping
with Congressional intent, for the main purpose of the new four year
statute of limitations was to eliminate state "forum-shopping.) 28 By
adopting federal characterization, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
would acknowledge the policy underlying treble damage actions and
remove the obstacles which penal characterization now places in the
path of the plaintiff in a private antitrust action.
2 6 Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. (1906).
27 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
28 "The disparity in the state statutes (varying between one and twenty years) pro-
moted 'forum-shopping' and finally resulted in an awareness of the need for a federal
limitation period that would provide uniformity throughout the United States." Kansas
City, Missouri v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1962). See
Wiprud, supra note 25, at 31.
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